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I INTRODUCTION 
In modern "dating and mating" situations, tn which alcohol is frequently 
consumed, sex which occurs when one or both of the parties are drunk raises some 
important legal issues. What is the ability of the woman to give consent in this 
situation? How much the man does the man have to know about his partner's ability 
to give consent before he no can no longer say that he reasonably believed she 
consented? 
Because the majority of rape complaints are brought by a woman against a 
man, in most situations it is the woman's consent that is in question at trial. While 
male on male rape and female on male rape is not an issue to be neglected, this paper 
adopts the assumption that the woman is giving consent while the man is seeking 
consent, in accordance with the majority ofrape cases that come to trial. 
This paper is concerned with scenarios in which a woman, "A", has voluntarily 
ingested alcohol and is physically functioning at the time of sexual intercourse. She 
has reached a state of drunkenness of her own volition, as she was neither drugged by 
her partner nor was she plied with drink. She is, however, very drunk, to the point of 
slurring her words and being unsteady on her feet , and she may express a range of 
other intoxicated behaviour including vomiting and lack of coordination. So, while 
she is experiencing more than just the mildly disinhibitory and relaxant effects of 
alcohol, she never enters a state of unconsciousness or complete physical 
incapacitation. She is at a problematic intermediate stage that Dixon, in his discussion 
of alcohol and rape, terms "impaired sex". 1 
This paper focuses on two important features of the above scenano: the 
woman's ability to consent to sex; and the relevance of the fact that she is voluntarily 
intoxicated. In the New Zealand Court of Appeal case of R v Sturm (Sturm) , the Court 
commented on both these issues.2 In relation to intoxicated consent, the Court 
observed that, although A was functional and gave a token of consent, the jury should 
1 
Nicholas Dixon "Alcohol and Rape" (2001) 15 Public Affairs Quarterly 341 , 343. 2 R v Sturm [2005] 3 NZLR 252 (CA). 
4 
still examine whether her consent satisfied the legal requirements for consent.
3 This 
paper is in agreement with the Court on that observation. 
However, the Court went on to confuse the consent issue with the voluntariness 
issue. It noted that if A is voluntarily intoxicated and she gives a token of consent, the 
voluntariness of her intoxication renders her consent valid.
4 This paper is not in 
agreement with the Court's position on this point. It is incorrect to consider the 
voluntariness of A's intoxication as going to whether she did or did not consent. This 
is only relevant to whether her sexual partner, "B", was not liable for rape on the basis 
that he reasonably believed that A consented. 
This essay has three parts. The first deals with A's consent; the second, with the 
confusion between consent and voluntariness of intoxication that occurred in Sturm; 
and the third, with B 's reasonable belief in consent. 
Part one focuses purely on the position of A, her state of mind, and the quality 
of her consent. If A unambiguously agrees to have sex with a man only because she is 
extremely intoxicated, she is not operating in accordance with her sober preferences. 
She may not even be aware of what her sober preferences are. Part one examines how 
we should regard her "token" of consent in that situation. The position that was taken 
in Sturm on the consent issue is supported. It is argued that her intoxicated agreement 
does not render it legally permissible for her partner to have sex with her. If the issue 
comes to trial, the jury is to examine whether her drunken "yes" satisfied the legal 
requirements for consent. 
Part two examines the judicial comments in Sturm as they relate to the 
voluntariness of A's intoxication. Unlike the consent issue, the Court ' s treatment of 
the voluntariness issue is not supported. For several reasons, it is incorrect to gauge 
A's capacity to consent by reference to whether she was voluntarily drunk or not. 
This is not to say that the voluntariness of A's intoxication is completely 
irrelevant. Part three considers the issue of A's voluntary intoxication where it should 
be considered, which is how it impacted upon her partner's belief that she was 
consenting. Thus part three focuse on A's sexual partner, B, and his state of mind 
3 Ibid, para 49 (CA) Judgment of the Court. 
4 Ibid, para 48 (CA) Judgment of the Court. 
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with regard to his belief in A's consent. This is the "reasonable belief' inquiry. If A is 
voluntarily drunk and she gives an apparent but invalid consent cue, currently, if B 
has a reasonable belief that A consents, he is not guilty of rape. This paper supports 
retaining a lack of reasonable belief as part of the mens rea of the crime of rape. 
However, if a man' s sexual partner is very drunk, yet he believes that she consents, it 
is necessary for him to reinforce the reasonableness of his belief by taking steps to 
ensure the quality of her consent. 
These issues are due for consideration because of the existence of section 
128A(4) of the Crimes Act 1961 , which is the New Zealand legislature's 
acknowledgment that intoxication can affect a person's ability to legally consent to 
sex. The provision gives little to no guidance on how judges and juries should deal 
with the consent and the voluntariness issues in a rape trial. There has also been little 
judicial interpretation of the provision, since it was only enacted in 2005. It is 
necessary to consider how Courts and jurors in the future are likely to approach these 
two key issues. Jurors in particular need more legislative guidance than is currently 
provided by section 128A( 4) alone. 
The paper argues for legislative reform. Provided that the law is duly 
promulgated, it is reasonable to use it to send a message to society about standards of 
acceptable sexual behaviour and to expect people to conform to these standards. The 
expectation that citizens adjust their behaviour to conform with the law is one of the 
central tenets of a legal system. 5 Therefore, if the burden on men to establish consent 
is to be increased, it must be accompanied by educational measures which target both 
men and women to increase their understanding of the interaction between sex, 
intoxication, and rape, and to reduce the frequency of men and women embarking on 
intoxicated sexual encounters which result in harm to one, the other, or both of them. 
II THE LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS OF RAPE 
Under New Zealand law, rape is a statutory offence contained within section 
128(2) ofthe Crimes Act 1961: 
"128(2): Person A rapes person B if person A has sexual connection with person B, 
5 
Lois Pineau "A Response to my Critics" in Leslie Franci s (ed) Date Rape, cited in Nicholas Dixon, 
above n 1, 348. 
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effected by the penetration of person B's genitalia by person A's penis,-
(a) without person B's consent to the connection; and 
(b) without believing on reasonable grounds that person B consents to the 
connection." 
(In the above provision, person A is the man for the purposes of this paper and 
person B is the woman.) 
Thus If A claims that she was raped while she was intoxicated, she must 
establish that she and B had sex; that she did not consent; and that B did not 
reasonably believe she consented. All three elements must be proved beyond 
reasonable doubt to obtain a rape conviction. This paper does not consider cases in 
which it is disputed whether the sexual connection took place. It is accepted that sex 
occurred, but the parties dispute whether, due to A's intoxication, it was consensual, 
and whether B reasonably believed that A consented. 
A Factual versus Legal Consent 
The word "consent" can be used in a range of different senses. It is important to 
preface Part One with a discussion of the difference between a factual and a legal 
consent. A "factual" consent occurs in "every instance in which a person can be found 
or deemed to acquiesce to something."6 It is an assent that is unfettered by normative 
or legal requirements or implications. A "legal" consent, in contrast, satisfies the legal 
requirements for consent as set down by the legislature and through the courts. All 
legal consents are factual consents, but not every factual consent will satisfy the 
requirements of a legal consent. In the scenario with which this paper is concerned, 
there is always a factual consent in the form of an agreement to have intercourse 
induced by intoxication. But, as will be demonstrated, this does not always satisfy the 
legal requirements for consent. 
III A'S CONSENT 
A Section 128A(4) 
6 Peter Westen The Logic of Consent (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004) 4. 
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Despite the centrality of the consent issue, the Crimes Act does not define 
consent. It does however state within section 128A( 4) that: 
"Section 128A( 4): A person does not consent to sexual activity if the activity 
occurs while he or she is so affected by alcohol or some other drug that he or 
she cannot consent or refuse to consent to the activity." 
Therefore at trial, to establish non-consent due to intoxication, A must establish 
that she could not consent or refuse to consent because she was so affected by alcohol 
according to section l 28A( 4). The onus is on the Crown to establish that A did not 
consent, rather than on the defence to prove that she did. 
Whether A consented or not is a question for the jury. Where intoxicated 
consent is in issue, it will be necessary for the judge to direct the jury on the meaning 
of consent, but there are no statutory model directions for doing so. The trial judge 
determines how he or she will direct the jury according to the complexity of the facts 
at hand. 7 
Section 128A( 4) has only been in existence since its insertion into the Crimes 
Act by the Crimes Amendment Act (No 2) 2005. The New Zealand Law Society has 
observed that it gives little guidance as to the factual circumstances in which an 
intoxicated consent is invalidated at law- it is unclear the level, or more accurately, 
the nature of intoxication that constitutes being "so affected" as to be unable to 
consent. 8 In particular, it is unclear whether it includes cases in which A remains 
functional but, because of intoxication, is incapable of giving a "true" consent, or 
whether it is limited to cases in which A gave no consent because she was in a 
physically incapacitated state. 
It is not yet known for certain whether the Courts will interpret section 128A( 4) 
so as to restrict its application to cases of physical incapacity, because there has been 
little direct judicial consideration of the provision as of yet. However, the Court of 
Appeal in Sturm did discuss the issue of intoxicated consent one month after the 
7 R v 0/ugboja [ 1981] 3 All ER 443, 448 (CA) Dunn LJ for the Court. 
8 Women's Consultative Group of the New Zealand Law Society "Submissions to the Law and Order 
Committee on Crimes Amendment Bill (No 2) 2004" 
www.lawyers.org.nzlgeneral/submissions/Crimes%20Amendment%20(No2)2003%20WGC.htm 
(accessed I July 2008). 
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enactment of the prov1s1on, and the approach the Court took could (and should) 
influence the interpretation of section 128A(4) in the future. 
B R v Sturm 
The Court in Sturm observes that the fact that A experiences a drug-induced 
receptiveness to sex as a result of heavy intoxication does not entail that she 
consented. This is the Sturm approach to intoxicated consent. (The Court later 
qualified this statement with a consideration of the voluntariness of the intoxication, 
but at this stage of the paper, only the comments on intoxicated consent are being 
considered). 
Section l 28A( 4) was actually not under consideration in the appellate Sturm 
decision, because the provision was not in existence at the time of the original trial 
judgment. Instead the Court referenced their comments on intoxicated consent to the 
common law definition of consent, which holds that a true consent must be full, free, 
voluntary and informed. 9 But, since section 128A(4) was intended to codify the 
existing common law position on intoxicated consent, '0 the comments made in Sturm 
about how the common law treats intoxicated consent are relevant to the 
interpretation of the provision. 
At paragraph 46, the Court cites an article written by Emily Finch and Vanessa 
Munro in 2003, entitled "Intoxicated Consent and the Boundaries of Drug-assisted 
Rape." 11 In it the authors suggest that heavy intoxication can lead to three distinct 
outcomes for A. Firstly, it can induce unconsciousness. Secondly, it can induce a state 
of physical incapacity similar to a stupor in which A is physically incapable of 
demonstrating a consent cue or of resisting B' s sexual advances (tenned a state of 
inert unresponsiveness.) Thirdly, it can engender an uncharacteristic drug-induced 
receptiveness to sexual activity which A would reject if she were sober (termed a state 
of drug-induced receptiveness to sex). 
Thus, the second and third outcomes raised by Finch and Munro directly relate 
to the issue raised by section l 28A( 4), which is whether A must be physically 
9 R v Cox (7 November 1996) CA 213/96. 
1° Crimes Amendment Bill (No 2) 2005, no 104-1 (Explanatory Note) iv. 
11 E Finch and VE Munro "Intoxicated Consent and the Boundaries of Drug-assisted Rape" (2003) 
Crim LR 773 . 
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incapacitated to fall within it (in a state of inert unresponsiveness) or, whether she 
falls within it if she is still functioning, and experiencing a state of drug-induced 
receptiveness to sex. If A experiences a state of alcohol-induced unconsciousness then 
her non-consent is provided for by section 128A(3), which holds that: 
"Section 128A(3): A person does not consent to sexual activity where he or she 
is asleep or unconscious at the time the sexual activity occurs." 
At paragraph 48 the Court observes, in regard to the third outcome, that "in such 
cases [of a drug-induced receptiveness to sex] an apparent consent may not be a true 
consent in that once the drug has taken effect on the mind of the person, the ability to 
form an informed and voluntary consent will have been impaired to a greater or lesser 
degree." 12 
So, evidence that A experienced a drug-induced receptiveness to sex and gave 
an apparent consent does not entail that A legally consented. The Sturm approach is to 
look past the intoxicated consent cue and examine whether A's consent was full , 
voluntary, free and informed. It may not be voluntary and informed if it was induced 
by intoxication. The Court then goes on to say that whether or not there is consent is 
ultimately a question for the jury. 
Carrying the Sturm approach through to section 128A( 4), the formulation of "so 
affected that she cannot consent" would include cases where A gives an apparent but 
not a true consent because she is under the effect of alcoho I and experiencing a drug-
induced receptiveness to sex. The jury would be directed that evidence that A is still 
physically functioning will not necessarily mean that she was capable of giving a 
legal consent, and that they must still inquire into whether her consent satisfied the 
common law requirements of being full, voluntary, free and informed. 
C The Effects of Alcohol 
Adopting a Sturm approach to section 128A( 4) , and extending it to cases where 
A experiences the third outcome, of a drug-induced receptiveness to sex, and gives an 
apparent but not genuine consent cue, is recommended. 
12 R v Sturm , above n 2, para 48 Judgment of the Court. 
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Research into the effects of alcohol has concluded that, ''with moderate to heavy 
consumption, alcoho 1 and marijuana have properties similar to that of both GHB and 
Rohypnol." 13 GHB and Rohypnol lower anxiety and alertness whilst inducing 
passivity and a sense of relaxation and well-being. They distinctively alter the 
victim's thought processes and behaviour, making her highly suggestible to the 
suggestions of others and causing her to engage in uncharacteristic, uninhibited 
behaviour. 14 
Thus, if A is heavily inebriated she is likely to find a suggestion of sex more 
acceptable than she would if she were sober. She is functioning at a reduced physical 
capacity so is more likely to accept coercion or coaxing by her partner's sexual 
advances. She may comply, willingly, with suggestions of sexual intercourse because 
her judgment is impaired and her will to object is reduced. But this does not and 
should not entail that she legally consents, for the reasons discussed below. 
1 The value of consent 
Commentators on the subject of consent identify that consent is valuable because 
it protects two dimensions of A's autonomy. 
15 The requirement that A consent before 
sex is permissible protects her right to refuse unwanted sexual contact, thereby 
protecting her negative sexual autonomy, but the fact that A can consent protects her 
positive sexual autonomy, or her right "to seek emotional intimacy and sexual 
fulfilment with willing partners" 
16 when she so desires. 
But consent is also valuable because it recognises that A is an autonomous 
agent who decides when and whether to give her consent according to the moral 
values and principles that she has made for herself 
17 The law protects her from 
unwanted sexual intercourse, but she decides when intercourse is wanted and 
unwanted, according to her sober preferences. Therefore consent is, or it should be, a 
13L Slaughter " Involvement of Drugs in Sexual Assault" (2000) 45 Journal of Reproductive Medicine 
425 , 429, cited in E Finch and VE Mw1ro, above n 11 , 778. 
14 E Finch and VE Munro, above n 11 , 778. 
15 Stephen Schulhofer "Rape-Law Reform circa June 2002: Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?" 
(2003) 989 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 276; Alan Wertheimer Consent to Sexual 
Relations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) 125. 
16 Stephen Schulhofer Unwanted Sex (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1998) xi, cited in 
Alan Wertheimer, above n 15, 125. 
17 Alan Wertheimer, above n 15, 125. 
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reflection of A's long tenn higher order preferences. When A is drunk, these 
preferences are obscured. To enforce A's consent where it does not accord with her 
sober preferences is to compel A to live in accordance with her non-moral or non-
reflective desires, which is not to live an autonomous life. 18 
Some may argue that, if we make it legally impermissible for women to have 
intercourse when it does not accord with their sober preferences, we are restricting the 
autonomy of all those women whose sober preferences are to drink heavily as a 
precursor to sexual intercourse. The difference, however, is that these women are 
sober when they make the decision to override their own consent capacity with 
alcohol. To have sex when they are in an advanced state of intoxication accords with 
their sober preferences. This can be contrasted with women who override their sober 
preferences about sex only because they are intoxicated. Their alcohol-induced 
consent is inconsistent with their sober preferences and should therefore be considered 
invalid. 
2 Consent as a subjective state 
The alternative to the Sturm approach to section l 28A( 4) would be to restrict its 
application to cases in which the complainant could establish that she was physically 
incapacitated. This amounts to using a predefined physical state to illustrate non-
consent. If A is in a stupor, then her consent is questionable, but if she remains 
physically functional and apparently cooperative, then she gives good consent. 
The above approach is in conflict with the established common law position, 
which treats consent as a subjective state rather than an expression. 19 The expression 
of A's consent is not what makes it legally petmissible for A's sexual partner to 
proceed to have sex with her; it is the fact that her consent cue is accompanied by a 
genuinely consensual state of mind. To restrict section l 28A( 4) to cases of physical 
incapacity incorrectly misdirects the consent inquiry away from the victim's state of 
mind, towards evidence of her physical inability. 
Furthermore, it would be a mistake to assume that the woman who experiences 
physical incapacity must be more intoxicated than her physically functional 
18 Ibid, 126. 
19 R v Isherwood ( 14 March 2005) CA 258/04, para 36 Judgment of the Court. 
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counterpart. If A becomes very drunk, very quickly, she may experience an alcohol-
induced blackout. In this state she is capable of engaging in detailed behaviours such 
as holding a conversation, and even driving a vehicle, because her short-term memory 
remains functional. But she is just as, if not more so, intoxicated than a woman who 
lapses into a state of unconsciousness or physical incapacitation. 20 It may be much 
more common for social drinkers to experience such blackouts than was previously 
thought,21 so physical incapacity may in fact be less likely to result from heavy 
intoxication than continued functionality. 
3 The range of intoxication outcomes 
As a matter of practical reality, intoxication is unlikely to affect A by resulting in 
two discretely experienced pharmacological states of either inability to resist or 
increased receptiveness to sex. It is probable that drinkers will experience behaviours 
characteristic of both pharmacological outcomes, since alcohol's effects on cognitive 
and physical capacities are wide-ranging and variable, and include slurring, 
unsteadiness, sleepiness and loss of hand-eye-brain coordination, and at higher blood-
alcohol concentrations vomiting, blackouts, memory loss and unresponsiveness.22 It is 
not unreasonable or incredible to suggest that A may be unresponsive, feel sedated, 
not in control of her body or able to resist, while also cooperating or complying with 
sexual intercourse. 
This situation arose m the California Supreme Court decision of People v 
Giardino, 23 in which A felt woozy, light headed and not "altogether there" after 
drinking alcohol. She was uncoordinated and required physical support from others at 
various stages of the night. Some minutes after having lain prone on the floor unable 
to dress herself, she had sex with two males upon their encouragement. In this case A 
was in a state in which she was both physically unresponsive and sedated, but also 
compliant and apparently cooperative with a suggestion to have intercourse. The fact 
of her cooperation does not mean that she consented. 24 (Although at trial, the jury 
20 Aaron M White "What Happened? Alcohol, Memory Blackouts, and the Brain" (2003) 27 Alcohol 
Research and Health 186, 188. 
2 1 Ibid, 189. 
22 Ibid, 186. 
23 People v Giardino (2000) 82 Cal App 454 (4"' Cir). 
24 Professor Gerald Orchard "Sexual Violation : The Rape Law Reform Legislation" (1986) 12 New 
Zealand Universities Law Review 97, 99. 
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found that she did not consent, on appeal the conviction was reversed on the ground 
that the trial judge had failed to give adequate instructions concerning the level of 
intoxication sufficient to void consent.) 
4 False distinction between willingness and consent 
Adams on Criminal Law cites Finch and Munro's third outcome and states 
that section l 28A( 4) does not extend to cases of drug-induced receptiveness to sex, 
because, "in cases of drug induced 'willingness' it is inaccurate to say that the 
complainant "cannot" consent as a result of the ingestion of the drug. Rather the 
complainant's ''willingness" to participate in the activity may not be genuine because 
it is the result of the drug."25 
The issue here is with words and with an artificial distinction between drug-
induced willingness and drug-induced consent. If A is induced by alcohol to be more 
willing to have sex, the alcohol is consenting to the intercourse, not the woman who 
has ingested it. Whether A is physically incapable of resisting or whether she is 
experiencing a false receptiveness to sex, in both cases intoxication deprives her of 
her ability to demonstrate her stable sober preferences. 
D The Role of the Jury 
A discussion of the interpretation of section 128A(4) must also consider the 
approach that the jury will take towards the provision, given that the jury decides 
whether or not there was consent in any given case. With the current wording of 
section l 28A( 4), it is unlikely that jurors will appreciate that a drug-induced consent 
cue does not indicate a consent. This is a ground on which to reword section 128A(4). 
In a small-scale mock juror trial which dealt with intoxicated consent in a rape 
case, Finch and Munro found that the mock jurors in the study made a number of legal 
errors around A's capacity to give consent when she is intoxicated.26 For example, 
some participants were willing to rule out consent only if A was in an intoxicant-
25 
Hon Bruce Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law (loose leaf, Brookers, Wellington, Crimes Act, 
1992) para CA 128.05 www.brookersonline.co.nz (18 August 2008). 
26 
E Finch and VE Munro " Juror Sterotypes of Blame Attribution in Rape Cases Involving intoxicants: 
Findings ofa Pilot Study'' (2005) 45 British Journal of Criminology 25. 
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induced unconscious state.27 This is not reflective of the current legal position, which 
holds that A's consent capacity can evaporate at a stage well before the onset of 
unconsciousness. The jurors also demonstrated prejudicial attitudes towards 
intoxicated women as rape victims which affected their ultimate decision as to the 
existence of consent.28 
Although this study was based on British law and British participants, it is likely 
that jurors in New Zealand trials also make errors in the way they approach intoxicated 
consent. A study done by Yvette Tinsley into juror decision-making in New Zealand 
criminal trials found that there were only 13 of the 48 trials in which jurors had not 
developed a fairly fundamental misunderstanding of the law.29 Some jurors, for 
example, were confused about the concept of intent. 30 Although these were not rape 
trials, in a rape trial, where an equally complex concept such as consent is in issue, 
there is a risk that jurors will misunderstand the legal position. 
To minimise the risk of intoxicated consent rape cases being decided according 
to juror error and prejudice, a clear statement about A's capacity to legally consent 
when intoxicated is required on the face of the statute. 
E Recommendations 
I Legislative reforms 
While the Court's comments in Sturm on the consent issue are not determinative 
of how section l 28A( 4) will be interpreted by future Courts considering intoxicated 
consent, the Sturm approach is preferred. 
Furthermore, legislative reform is required. In the past, the legislature has been 
content to allow the principles of good consent to develop incrementally through the 
Court. For example, Parliament declined to include a definition of consent within the 
sexual offence provisions of the Crimes Act on the grounds that the common law 
definition was sufficient. 3 1 However, case law is ill-suited to deal with changing 
27 Ibid, 33. 
28 Ibid , 35. 
29 Yvette Tinsely "Juror Decision-Making: A Look Inside the Jury Room" in Roger Tarling (ed) The 
British Criminology Conference: Selected Proceedings (Leicester, July 2000) vol 4. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Crimes Amendment Bill (No 2) 2005, no 104-2 (Select Committee report) ix . 
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behaviour in modern sexual relations. With the increasingly widespread use of 
disinhibiting intoxicants, the onus is on the legislature to state clearly on the face of 
the statute that it is possible to lack the full measure of control over one's physical and 
cognitive capacities, so that one is not acting voluntarily, while at the same time 
accepting a passive or cooperative role in sexual intercourse, and that this does not 
necessarily equate to consent. 
This could be achieved by rewording section 128A(4) as follows: 
"Section I 28A( 4): A person does not consent to sexual activity if the activity 
occurs while he or she is so affected by alcohol or some other drug that he or 
she either: 
(a) cannot physically communicate his or her consent or refusal to consent 
to the activity, or; 
(b) is only induced to comply with sexual acts because of the effect of 
the alcohol or other drug." 
Section 128A(4)(b) indicates to jurors and the public that women who are 
physically functional but very intoxicated may not be capable of giving an informed 
and voluntary consent. Jurors should be instructed at trial not to take an intoxicated 
consent cue at face value. It is necessary to examine the quality of A's apparent 
consent cue to determine whether it was, according to the common law requirements 
for good consent, full , voluntary, free and informed. 
2 Educational measures 
Beyond sending a message through legislation about the impact of intoxication 
on consent, additional educational measures are also desirable. Studies of college 
students in the United States indicate that young people in particular believe alcohol 
plays an important role in facilitating sexual and social relationships.32 Thus for some 
women there is a clear linkage between drinking alcohol and having sex. There is 
always a risk that some of these women will experience significant psychological, 
32 Meichun Mohler-Kuo and others "Correlates of Rape While Intoxicated in a National Sample of 
College Women" (2004) 65 Journal of Studies on Alcohol 37 , 37 . 
16 
physical and emotional harm from being in a state of advanced intoxication in which 
they were compliant to sexual advances that they would normally reject. Increasing 
women's awareness that alcohol can induce uncharacteristically uninhibited sexual 
behaviour over which they may lack volition and control aims to reduce this risk, and 
thereby to reduce the harms of non-consensual intoxicated sex. 
IV CONFUSION OF CONSENT AND VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION 
While in Sturm the Court's comments on intoxicated consent are the favoured 
approach to section 128A( 4), their next comments, relating to voluntariness of 
intoxication, are less so. Having observed that a drug-induced receptiveness to sex 
does not entail that there was a legal consent, the Court went on to note that this is 
only the case where the person experiencing the state of drug-induced receptiveness is 
involuntarily intoxicated. The full quote within paragraph 48 of the case follows: 33 
In such cases [ of drug-induced receptiveness to sex] an apparent consent may not be a 
true consent in that once the drug has taken effect on the mind of the person, the 
ability to form an informed and voluntary consent will have been impaired to a greater 
or lesser degree. On the other hand, drugs may have been voluntarily taken with 
awareness of, and acceptance of, the likelihood of disinhibited and otherwise 
uncharacteristic behaviour. [Emphasis added]. 
Thus, the Court's approach is to hold that, if A experiences a drug-induced 
receptiveness to sex while involuntarily intoxicated, she may not have been capable of 
giving a genuine consent, and her consent capacity should be examined by the jury. 
On the other hand, if she drinks alcohol voluntarily, accepting the likelihood of 
uninhibited behaviour, and then experiences a drug-induced receptiveness to sex, her 
apparent consent should be taken as true consent. Her capacity to consent is 
detennined by whether she drank voluntarily or involuntarily. 
The Sturm approach to voluntary intoxication is a drastic change to the settled 
approach, established by the 1975 English Court of Appeal case of R v Lang, that A's 
consent is not determined by "how she came to take a drink" but whether at the time 
of intercourse she understood her situation and was capable of making up her mind. 
34 
33 R v Sturm , above n 2, para 48 Judgment of the Court. 
34 R v Lang (1975) 62 Cr.App.R 50, 52 . 
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As a matter of alcohol pharmacology, the effect of alcohol on A's consent capacity is 
exactly the same whether she is intoxicated by choice or not. However, the Court in 
Sturm says that the Lang approach of disregarding the circumstances of A's 
intoxication is no longer appropriate, given that disinhibiting drugs, including alcohol, 
are now taken by many on a voluntary basis. 35 The voluntariness of A's intoxication 
must have some relevance to B's liability for rape. 
As far as the Sturm approach recognises that A's voluntary intoxication is 
relevant to B 's liability for rape, it is not problematic. This is due to the existence 
within section 128 of the Crimes Act of the requirement that, in order to be guilty of 
rape, B must either knows A does not consent, be reckless as to whether she consents, 
or negligently believe that she does consent: that is, base his belief in her consent on 
unreasonable grounds. Therefore if B reasonably believes A consented, he is not 
guilty of rape. 36 
So, if A is surreptitiously administered alcohol by B so that she will be more 
likely to have sex with him, he could not rely on a reasonable belief in her consent as 
a defence to rape. As Dixon notes, "the very fact he used such a strategy implies that 
he doubts that she would agree to have sex with him if she were sober."37 Conversely, 
if A is voluntarily drunk, B did not administer intoxicants as a strategy to facilitate 
intercourse and may believe that she is voluntarily consenting. Thus the voluntariness 
or otherwise of A's intoxication goes to B's reasonable belief in consent. 
The Sturm approach to voluntary intoxication is misleading, because it 
considers voluntariness of intoxication as relevant to whether A consented, rather than 
whether B had a reasonable belief in consent. As far as the Court in R v Sturm 
confuses the consent issue with the voluntariness issue, it should not be adopted in the 
section l 28A( 4) inquiry. A better approach is to accept that, whether voluntarily or 
involuntarily intoxicated, if A cannot legally consent then she does not consent. But if 
her intoxication is voluntary, then B may have grounds on which to base a reasonable 
belief in consent. 
A Recognition of Harm 
35 R v Sturm, above n 2, para 48 Judgement of the Court. 
36 Crimes Act 1961 , s 128. 
37 Nicholas Dixon, above n 1, 344. 
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By stating that, if A drank voluntarily, she is deemed to have consented to any 
intercourse which follows, the law fails to give adequate weight to the fact that A 
actually did not consent and that an act of non-consensual, potentially harmful sexual 
intercourse took place. In fact, complainants who drink voluntarily are required to 
absorb the responsibility for the harm caused by later non-consensual sex, because 
they drank alcohol with "awareness of, and acceptance of, the likelihood of 
disinhibited and otherwise uncharacteristic behaviour. "38 
It is probable that most women who drink alcohol are aware of its disinhibiting 
properties. But it is not fair to go further, and to assume that the average female 
drinker is aware that heavy intoxication can specifically induce an increased 
receptiveness to sex, and that every time she drinks she is deemed by the law to have 
given, in advance, a valid consent to sex should she later experience such a state. 
Furthermore, the harm that she may feel at having been subjected to sex in a state in 
which she could not consent is glossed over if the Court holds that she was capable of, 
and did, consent. 
B The Ideal Intoxicated Rape Victim 
The Sturm rule also creates a perception that voluntarily intoxicated women are 
less deserving of the protection of section 128A(4), because they do not fit the image 
of the "ideal" intoxicated rape victim. The "ideal" intoxicated rape follows the 
prototypical construction of a drug rape, in which the rapist surreptitiously administers 
an illicit drug rape drug, such as Rohypnol, to his female victim, inducing 
unconsciousness as a precursor to intercourse.39 As a matter of fact many, if not most, 
drug-assisted rapes deviate significantly from this template.40 But Sturm perpetuates 
the myth that the "real" intoxicated rape invo Ives an involuntarily intoxicated victim. 
Women who get heavily drunk by choice violate societal norms of "appropriate" 
female behaviour and therefore are not ideal victims. 4 1 
38 R v Stwm above n 2, para 98 Judgment of the Court. 
39 E Finch and VE Munro, above n 11 . 
40 Ibid. 
41 Abbey, Antonia and others "Alcohol, Mi sperception and Sexual Assault: How and Why Are They 
Linked?" in David M Buss and Neil M Malamuth (eds) Sex, Power, Conflict: Evolutionary and Female 
Perspectives (Oxford University Press, Oxford , 1996). 
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If the Sturm approach is adopted, the implicit condemnations of voluntarily 
intoxicated victims by the Courts will likely filter down into police and prosecutors' 
attitudes towards rape complainants. This may make a rape victim who was drinking 
at the time of the offence less likely to report it, even if her non-consent was absolute 
and legally unproblematic. In a study cited by Abbey and others, women victims of 
rape who were drinking prior to the rape considered themselves significantly more 
responsible than those who were not drinking.42 Sturm exacerbates this misplaced 
assumption of responsibility on to the voluntarily intoxicated woman. 
C The Fear of False Rape Claims 
A feared increase in false rape claims is also behind the obfuscation of the 
consent issue by the voluntariness of A's intoxication. Finch and Munro believe that to 
legitimise A' s non-consent in cases of drug-induced receptiveness when she is 
voluntarily intoxicated would be to allow women to retrospectively revoke what was 
at the time a genuine, albeit intoxicated, consent. Women may "seek refuge" in their 
voluntary intoxication because, based upon a sober re-evaluation of events, they regret 
having had sex or wish to avoid social censure for having sexual intercourse while 
drunk. 43 Indeed, the fear of such "mischievous accusations" was the very reason the 
British Parliament rejected voluntary intoxication as a basis of non-consent when they 
reformed their sexual offence provisions in 2003. Fonner Home Secretary David 
Blunkett, discussing the reforms in Parliament in 2002, stated that" it is worth making 
it clear that I have rejected the suggestion that someone inebriated could claim that 
they were unable to give consent - as opposed to someone who was unconscious for 
whatever reason, including because of alcohol, and was therefore unable to do so - on 
the ground that we do not want mischievous accusations".44 
This argument, while not explicitly stated by the Court, may have been in the 
minds of the judges in Sturm when they formed their stance on voluntary intoxication. 
They cite the Finch and Munro aiticle which raises the spectre of retrospective 
revocation of consent,45 and historically, judicial dicta illustrate a profound scepticism 
42 Ibid. 
43 E Finch and VE Mw1ro, above n 11 , 783. 
44 
( 19 November 2002) HC col 512 . 
45 R v Sturm , above n 2, para 46. 
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towards women rape complainants.46 As recently as 1975, judges expressed the view 
that "it is well known that women in particular, and small boys, are liable to be 
untruthful and invent stories". 47 It was believed that it was easy for women to bring a 
false rape complaint to achieve a given aim: 48 
There are few crimes in which false charges are more easily or confidently made than in 
rape. Experience has shown that unfounded charges of rape are brought for a variety of 
motives. The adage, 'Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned', is frequently 
encountered in rape prosecutions. 
If such thinking influenced the judges in R v Sturm, and it is not beyond the 
realms of possibility, the fear of a rise in false rape claims is an insufficient ground 
upon which to deprive voluntarily intoxicated women of the protection of section 
128A( 4). 
The false rape claim debate is dominated by two things: assumptions, fuelled by 
media representations, that women use rape complaints to "cry wolf' for a multitude 
ofreasons;49 and, a dearth of empirically backed investigation into actual rates of false 
complaints. so A study undertaken by Jan Jordan in 2004 illustrated that accurate rates 
of false rape claims are difficult to obtain because of varying practice amongst New 
Zealand police in what are termed false complaints and how they are recorded. 51 It 
would be a breach of justice to exclude voluntarily intoxicated women from the reach 
of section 128A( 4) based on a misconceived belief in the prevalence of false rape 
claims, which is itselflargely a construction of false premises and assumptions. 
In response to the fear of false rape claims, Rumney and Fenton note that, as a 
practical matter, it depends on the complainant to make the false allegation. 52 Given 
that a large number of rapes go unreported, not all reported rapes are investigated, and 
even fewer reach the prosecution stage, the probability that one of these will be based 
upon a retrospective revocation of intoxicated consent, and that the jury will deliver a 
verdict of non-consent, seems slim, or at least not a justifiable ground for narrowing 
46 Jan Jordan "Beyond Belief? Police, rape and women's credibility'' (2004) 4 Criminal Justice 29, 30 
47 Judge Sutcliffe, 1976, cited in Jan Jordan, ibid , 31. 
48 Judge Ploscowe Sex and the Law ( 1951) 187 cited in Jan Jordan, ibid, 31. 
49 Gavey, Nicola and Gow, Virginia" 'Cry Wolf Cried the Wolf: Constructing the Issue of False Rape 
Allegations in New Zealand Media Texts" (2001) 11 Feminism and Psychology 341. 
50 Philip NS Rumney "False Allegations of Rape" (2006) 65 CLJ 128, 129 
5 1 Jan Jordan, above n 46, 34. 
52 Rumney, Philip NS and Fenton, Rachel Anne " Intoxicated Consent in Rape: Bree and Juror 
Decision-Making" (2008) 71 MLR 279, 290. 
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the application of section l 28A( 4) to involuntarily intoxicated women experiencing a 
state of drug-induced receptiveness. The effect that the Sturm rule for voluntary 
intoxication will have on already low reporting rates should be of more concern. 
V B'S REASONABLE BELIEF 
We can reject the Sturm approach, which confuses voluntary intoxication with 
A's consent capacity, but still hold the voluntariness of A's intoxication relevant to 
the existence of B's reasonable belief in consent. If A is voluntarily intoxicated as 
opposed to being drugged, B is more likely to believe she consented to sex. If B 's 
belief in A' s consent is reasonable, then he is not guilty of rape. 
A The Current Legal Position 
I An objective standard 
Prior to 1985, New Zealand Courts followed the decision of the House of 
Lords in DPP v Morgan, which held that the crime of rape requires knowledge of the 
absence of consent, or recklessness. 53 Therefore, it was only necessary that B have 
an honest belief in consent in order to avoid liability for rape. It did not matter 
whether that belief was reasonable or unreasonable. Now, the test is objectively 
assessed, so that B must honestly believe in consent and it must be reasonable in the 
circumstances for him to form this belie£ 54 However, it is established as a matter of 
law that if B is drunk and his drunkenness induces him to believe that A consents, he 
will not be held to have a reasonable belief in consent. 55 
2 Determining reasonable belief 
Whether B ' s belief in consent is reasonable is a matter for the jury, because it is 
a factual question going to what B actually believed, and whether this was reasonable 
given the circumstances. Although B's belief in consent must be reasonable, there is 
no legal obligation for him to check that his partner consents as part of establishing 
53 DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182 (HL). 
54 Crimes Act 1961 , s 128. 
55 R v Clarke [1992] 1 NZLR 147, 149 (CA). 
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the reasonableness of his belief At trial, the onus is on the Crown to show that B's 
belief was not reasonable, rather than on B to show that his belief was reasonable. 56 
B B 's State of Mind 
In a case in which A is voluntarily intoxicated, B has not drugged A, nor has he 
plied her with drink. He either meets A when she is already drunk, or he drinks with 
her with no designs on getting her drunk. In that case he may have one of two states of 
mind. He may opportunistically take advantage of A's intoxicated state to have sex 
with her, knowing that she would not consent if she were sober. Alternatively, he may 
realise that A is very intoxicated but honestly believe that she is capable of giving a 
genuine consent. 
In the first scenario, Dixon would support holding that B lacks a reasonable 
belief in consent, because he knows that A would not have sex with him if she were 
sober, therefore he has no belief in her genuine consent.57 Although he may be less 
culpable because he did not administer the alcohol that made B intoxicated, he has no 
more of a belief in the voluntariness of A's consent than does the man who drugs A or 
plies her with alcohol to facilitate sexual intercourse. 
In the second scenario, B genuinely believes that A consents. She may be 
staggering, slurring and even vomiting, but she does not descend into complete 
physical incapacity. She is also compliant and cooperative with B 's sexual advances. 
Assuming that it was established earlier in this paper that the law provides that a 
drunken consent cue is legally questionable, this will alter what it is reasonable, at law, 
for B to believe in this situation about his partner's capacity to consent. 
C A New Approach to Reasonableness 
As long as legal consent is held to be something that is subjectively felt rather 
than objectively expressed, it is important to retain the reasonable belief element of the 
crime of rape. However, even if A is voluntarily intoxicated, and if B believes that she 
is capable of consenting, it is necessary for him to take steps to establish that his belief 
is reasonable. 
56 R vDaniels [1986] 2 NZLR 106, 114 (CA). 
57 Nicholas Dixon, above n l , 346. 
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B would not be required to present in Court a "consent contract" or something 
similar which establishes beyond doubt that his partner consented- although, if he 
chooses to do so, it will no doubt support a reasonable belief in consent. It is a fact of 
the rape trial that B would have to present the evidence of the steps he took, and it 
would be the jury's task to determine the credibility of that evidence. 
I B 's responsibility 
Putting the onus on men to establish that their sexual partner truly consents, and 
requiring them to hold up evidence of the reasonableness of their belief in consent in 
Court, represents a fundamental shift to the burden of proof, which traditionally rests 
with the prosecution, not the defence. It may be argued that B has to bear a greater 
burden for A's intoxication than does A. Perhaps. But while A is responsible for 
getting herself into a state in which she cannot legally consent, once in that state, she is 
not responsible for unwanted sexual acts committed by B when she cannot consent; 
this is B's responsibility. Wertheimer notes that men's legal and moral burden may 
indeed be greater. But women would continue to bear the physical and emotional 
burdens from unwanted intoxicated sexual relations. 58 
Provided that the proposed changes to section 128A( 4) with regard to 
intoxicated consent are duly promulgated, B should be aware that A is potentially 
unable to consent when she is very intoxicated. He is then responsible for ensuring 
that A' s consent is sufficiently legally transformative to render his actions permissible. 
2 A 's responsibility 
It is reasonable to hold A responsible for voluntarily becoming intoxicated. But 
it does not follow that she is must absorb responsibility for all the consequences that 
flow from that, including the erosion of her consent capacity and unwanted sexual 
intercourse. As Wertheimer notes, we may desire autonomous agents to be held 
morally responsible for their choices, but does this also mean that we should require 
women to internalize all the consequences of that behaviour?59 This is arguably a 
reflection of dominant social norms which tend to hold intoxicated men less 
58 Alan Wertheimer " Intoxicated Consent to Sexual Relations" (2001) 20 Law and Philosophy 373 , 
40 I. 
59 Alan Wertheimer, above n 15 , 244. 
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responsible for their behaviour but hold intoxicated women more responsible.60 
Wertheimer puts it in retributive terms: the "punishment" of treating A's consent as 
valid may not fit the "crime" of becoming intoxicated.61 Moreover, the fact that we 
may desire to assign some responsibility to A for inducing her own intoxicated state, 
does not mean that we should let B "off the moral hook"62 for having sex with 
someone who could not consent. 
3 Consistency of Re~ponsibility 
Susan Estrich argues that, if men are capable of forming the mens rea required to 
do a criminal act even when they are extremely drunk, then the law should treat 
women as capable of giving a valid consent, even though they are extremely drunk. 
There should be consistency of responsibility between these two situations. To hold 
otherwise would be to condescend to women and to treat them as being insufficiently 
autonomous to be held responsible for their own behaviour. 63 
This consistency "claim", notes Wertheimer, exerts "strong intuitive moral 
pull"64 for assigning the burden of intoxicated consent to A, not B. It seems unfair that, 
if both a man and a woman are intoxicated when they have sex, the woman can point 
to her intoxication as evidence of non-consent, but the man cannot point to his 
intoxication as the reason why he reasonably believed that his partner consented. 
But this desire to even things up between intoxicated men and women fails to 
recognise that the mental state required for criminal wrongdoing is inherently different 
from the mental state that is required to give a valid consent. 65 Forming the mens rea 
required to commit a crime means determining what action one will take or omit to 
take. In contrast, fanning the mens rea of a consensual state of mind says what it is 
permissible for others to do to you. Consent in these circumstances is transformative, 
because it renders it legally permissible for B to have sex with A. Such 
transfonnations, arguably, "require a deeper expression of the agent's will than the 
60 Abbey, Antonia and others, above n 41 . 
61 
Alan Wertheimer, above n 15, 245. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Susan Estrich "Palm Beach Stories" 11 Law and Philosophy 5 (1992) I 0, cited in Alan Wertheimer, 
above n 15, 243 . 
64 Alan Wertheimer, above n 15 , 253 . 
65 Ibid , 244. 
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intentions required for culpability for wrongdoing."66 Furthermore, what is being 
consented to is a fundamentally intimate crossing of A's sexual and personal 
boundaries. These boundaries are arguably ''the most important attributes of our 
humanity."67 The capacity required to give a valid consent, then, is more robust than 
that which is required to assign responsibility for criminal wrongdoing. The 
consistency claim may exert strong moral pull but this alone does not support equating 
the mens rea of c01mnitting a crime with the mens rea of giving a legally 
transformative consent. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Given that alcohol is consumed on a regular basis by men and women in social 
and dating situations, it is necessary to consider the effects that intoxication can have 
on their ability to give, and to get, a consent to sex that satisfies the requirements of 
the law. Perhaps because alcohol features so regularly in social interactions, people 
may not give sufficient weight to the "sledgehammer"68 effect that it can have on 
physical and cognitive capacities, including the capacity to consent to sex. This can 
lead to harmful sexual interactions, in which A is not capable of giving consent but B 
reasonably believes she is. If the issue goes to trial, the result is that A suffers the 
harms of non-consensual sex, while B suffers the harm of being put on trial for a 
violent sexual crime. 
The reforms recommended in this paper aim to clarify understanding of the 
interface between intoxication and consent and to reduce the likelihood of such harms 
arising on a frequent basis. It is probably unavoidable that men and women will 
continue to drink alcohol and engage in intoxicated sexual relations. Both these 
behaviours are legal and, moreover, common. The challenge for the law is to strike 
the co1Tect balance between allowing positive intoxicated sexual encounters and 
minimising harmful ones. At the moment, the Courts are taking the lead, but it is now 
necessary for clear legislative direction in regard to intoxicated consent and 
reasonable belief. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Nagel "Concealment and Exposure" 4 cited in Alan Wertheimer, above n 15 , I 06. 
68 Aaron M White, above n 20, 186. 
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The Ministry of Justice has just released a discussion document which seeks 
public opinion on a number of reforms that could potentially improve the criminal 
justice system's response to sexual offending. With the possibility of a complete 
reform of rape laws and the rape trial on the horizon, 69 Parliament has the opportunity 
to make a statement about the importance of giving and getting full and genuine 
consent in intoxicated sexual relations. It is hoped that the issues raised in this paper 
will feature highly in any future reforms. 
69 Ministry of Justice Improvements to Sexual Violence Legislation in New Zealand: Public Discussion 
Document (Wellington, 2008). 
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